The foreign press act like a few fashion shows in Pakistan are somehow the cultural frontline in the fight against the Taliban
The Pakistan Fashion Design Council (PFDC) kicked off Lahore's very first fashion week earlier this month amid the glitz, glamour, gloss and beautiful people that come with such events.
Although the organisers were eager to provide a showcase for Pakistan's emerging fashion industry, they were also apprehensive about media coverage. They were well aware of how the Karachi fashion week had been reported by the international media last November, when the all-too-familiar contrasts between liberal Pakistani society and radical Taliban militancy counterposed high-fashion against guns and bombs.
Amid apprehensions about this kind of coverage the PFDC decided to invite fashion journalists from different parts of the world – but not the foreign media correspondents currently based in Pakistan. "We're pretty fed up of the headlines which were sensational and detrimental, saying 'This is not Pakistan', or 'This is Pakistan'," said Selina Rashid, public relations manager for the event. She added that, contrary to how the media has been portraying such events, they are purely business-related industry events, and not held in order to make outlandish statements of defiance, as was suggested by a Telegraph article last November headed "Pakistan fashion week defies Taliban with non-Islamic dress".
A video report by CNN, also covering the November fashion week in Karachi, created similar sensationalism by talking about "security concerns" and "a country fighting a bloody war against itself" with the backdrop of slender Pakistani models parading on the catwalk in skimpy dresses.
Despite the PR effort for last week's show, publications like the New York Times carried on highlighting the contrast between extremist violence and scantily clad models.
The implication that high fashion is somehow another front in the war on terror is something of a fallacy created by the media. Just because this expression of elite culture is diametrically opposed to the Taliban's vision of female modesty, it doesn't mean that more fashion shows will somehow damage the Taliban.
The "violence versus glamour" contrast isn't entirely a media fixation though. People involved in fashion shows also voluntarily dive into the discussion of how such events not only create what the government likes to call a "soft image of Pakistan" but might also bring about actual social change. "This is a huge feat for Pakistan, given the total perception of Pakistan at present is dictated by the political and security situations," said Hassan Sheheryar Yasin, a fashion designer and one of the founders of the PFDC. When asked if such high-fashion events can bring about social change, model Fia Khan replied, "We've had so many events. It has already bought some change. People's minds are changing."
It is obvious, though, that the kinds of outfits displayed in these shows would not be worn by the average Pakistani. Such luxury products are usually targeted towards exceptionally wealthy individuals, and mostly for consumption by foreign markets. Given that fashion is a form of personal expression reflecting the culture and attitudes of society, it is unlikely that developments confined to minute segments of society would create any significant trickle-down effect in the immediate future.
In light of this, it is interesting how the news media chooses to cover such events and developments in the context of terrorism, war, insurgency, radicalism and suicide bombings in Pakistan. Various reports in the past have drawn similar parallels such as rock music versus the Taliban, or the film industry versus religious radicalism. The question that arises is why such cultural contrasts in fact become the dominant means of discussing Pakistan in the international media to the extent that it has begun to affect how Pakistanis view themselves.
Equally disturbing are the government's own repeated PR efforts to promote a soft image of Pakistan – as if it is a given that appearances bear more significance than the actual. Instead of making real and on-the-ground efforts to engender tolerance, moderation, and understanding in society, it seems the government is more geared towards a more cosmetic media-hype facelift while letting all Pakistan's real problems simmer under a low flame.
Asif AkhtarBelinda Khan, 44, originally from Cardiff, was one of eight people killed when car bomb exploded in volatile Swat Valley
The Foreign Office today named a British woman who was among eight people killed by a suicide bomber at a busy market in Swat Valley, north-west Pakistan, yesterday.
Officials confirmed that 44-year-old Belinda Khan, from Cardiff, had died in the blast.
A spokesman said: "The next of kin have been informed, and we are providing consular assistance."
Khan was shopping at the market at the time of the blast, having only travelled to Pakistan earlier this month to get married.
Her Pakistani husband, Saeed Khan, said she had been in a car when the bomb exploded. He rushed to the scene and said she was silent, but still conscious.
"She looked at me and we just saw each other for three or four seconds," Khan told the Guardian.
There was a second blast when a gas canister in the car exploded. Khan pulled his wife from the vehicle and took her to Saidu Sharif hospital, where doctors failed to revive her. Belinda Khan converted to Islam in 2005 when she married Yahya Khan, who was working in a pizza restaurant in Cardiff.
Yahya was killed with three others during a Taliban raid in 2008. Belinda, who was also known by her Muslim name, Aama, was in the UK at the time.
She later married Yahya's brother Saeed. The two hoped to have their wedding in the UK, but Saeed was refused a visa. She flew to Pakistan on 8 February and married Saeed the following day.
"She came to have a second life with me. My family and I are missing her very much," he said.
She was buried in a cemetery yesterday, close to the family home in the village of Kuza Bandai. The ceremony took place after the permission of Belinda's brother, who lives in Cardiff.
Her grave was decorated in flowers, tinsel and messages of sympathy. One read: "We are proud of Belinda".
The attack, in the district capital of Mingora, was the latest violence to hit the volatile border region with Afghanistan, where the Pakistani military has been conducting operations against Taliban militants.
It happened at a junction surrounded by small shops and stalls as at least two vehicles carrying security forces passed by, officials and witnesses said.
TV footage showed the blast ripped out shopfronts and blown out car windows.
Several cars were gutted, and a fire engine rushed to extinguish a blaze ignited by the explosion.
"It was a suicide attack. Its target was security forces," Major Mishtaq Khan, the army spokesman in Swat, said. He said two soldiers were among the 37 people injured.
Lal Noor, the head of the Saidu Sharif hospital, said the bodies of eight people killed in the explosion had been brought to the hospital.
The Swat police chief, Muhammad Idrees, said items found at the scene, including parts of a mobile phone and a watch, were believed to have belonged to the suicide bomber.
Matthew WeaverMullah Abdul Kabir detained in north-western Nowshera district, US media reports say
An Afghan Taliban leader has been captured in Pakistan in what would be the fourth detention of a senior Taliban figure in recent weeks, US reports said today.
Mullah Abdul Kabir, a member of the Taliban's ruling council, was captured in the north-western Nowshera district several days ago, the New York Times and the Washington Post reported, citing unnamed Pakistani security officials.
Pakistani officials declined to confirm the reports.
If confirmed, the arrest would be a further sign that Pakistan is turning away from its old strategy of allowing Afghan Taliban leaders safe haven in the country – something that could have far-reaching implications for the war in Afghanistan.
Last week, Pakistani and US officials said Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the second in command of the Afghan Taliban, had been caught in the southern Pakistani city of Karachi around 10 days earlier.
Two other Taliban leaders, Mullah Abdul Salam, of Kunduz province, and Mullah Mohammad, of Baghlan province, were arrested separately in Pakistan between 10 and 12 days ago, the Kunduz governor, Mohammad Omar, said.
The reports gave few details of Kabir's arrest but said it happened recently.
• Suspected Taliban suicide attack kills at least eight
• Explosion is latest in volatile Pakistani border region
A blast apparently aimed at Pakistani security forces ripped through a busy market in the north-western Swat Valley today, killing at least eight people and wounding dozens of others, officials and witnesses said.
The attack in the district capital of Mingora was the latest violence in the region along the border with Afghanistan where the Pakistani military has been waging offensives against Taliban militants, who have been fighting back, often with homemade bombs.
Swat police chief Muhammad Idrees said items found at the scene of the attack suggested it may have been a suicide bombing, though an investigation would be needed to confirm it.
Witness Rahim Gul said the blast occurred as two vehicles carrying Pakistani security forces passed through the Nishat intersection, which is surrounded by small shops and stalls. But the security forces' vehicles appeared to be undamaged, Gul said.
Television footage of the scene showed a string of cars in the road that were gutted or had blown-out windows. A fire truck arrived to extinguish fires ignited by the blast and heavily armed security forces guarded the area.
Another witness, Shiraz Khan, said people could be heard crying for help immediately after the blast.
Dr Lal Noor, head of the Saidu Sharif hospital in Mingora, said at least eight people had died and 35 were wounded.
The Pakistani military launched an offensive in the mountainous Swat Valley early last year after peace deals with local Taliban collapsed and the militants took control of parts of the region just four hours' drive from Islamabad. The military took back the Swat Valley by mid-2009, but sporadic violence has continued.
The Swat Valley offensive drew strong praise from Washington, which has long urged Pakistan to do more to combat militants in the lawless tribal belt along the Afghan border and to root out al-Qaida militants believed to be sheltering there.
Pakistan followed up the Swat campaign with an offensive in the nearby South Waziristan tribal zone.
In recent months, the Taliban has been weakened by CIA missile strikes from unmanned drone aircraft in the border region that have killed some senior leaders.
This month, Pakistan also arrested three senior Afghan Taliban leaders – including the group's no2 commander – and rounded up dozens of other militant suspects, in raids sometimes carried out with US intelligence or other assistance.
Analysts are divided about whether the crackdown signals a shift in Pakistani policy in which security forces are finally going after militants who are thought to have long enjoyed sanctuary in the country, or if the arrests are part of a Pakistani strategy to position the country as a main player in any peace talks between the Taliban and the US-backed Afghan government.
In another part of the north-west, the decapitated bodies of two Sikhs were found almost a month after they were kidnapped in the Khyber tribal region, officials said today.
Local government official Jawed Khan said the family of one of the two men told authorities that kidnappers had demanded 15m rupees (£210,000) in ransom for his return.
Sikhs are a tiny minority in Islamic Pakistan, though there is a sizeable community in the north-west that has increasingly suffered persecution as Islamic extremists have gained influence in recent years.
India and Pakistan are holding their first high-level talks since the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008
At one o'clock, he is behind the dusty shelves of the small shop he runs with his father. A few phone calls and an hour later, he is walking through the streets of Srinagar's Nowhatta district, two friends in tow. Fashionable but scuffed shoes, turned-up dirty jeans, a ring on each finger and a chequered Arab-style scarf, Mehraan, 22 and already a veteran, knows where he is going: to the police checkpoint on the Gojwara Road.
"It's going to be big. We're under a lot of pressure, but it's going to be big," he says as he strides through narrow lanes, past food stalls, rubbish-strewn wasteland, and open drains full of human and animal waste.
Mehraan is a "stone-pelter", as they are now known in the Indian part of Kashmir, the disputed Himalayan state. For weeks now, it has been the same routine. An incident sparks a surge in demonstrations. There are injuries and finally a teenager is killed, hit by a teargas canister or shot. The demonstrations turn to riots, then repression brings a fragile calm. Until another cycle starts.
This week will see the first high-level official talks between India and Pakistan since the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008. The two states have fought three wars over Kashmir, which was split between them shortly after independence in 1947. The Mumbai attackers came from Pakistan, and New Delhi is demanding that terrorism be the focus of the forthcoming talks. Islamabad, however, wants to restart a broader dialogue, one that would include the future of Kashmir, India's only Muslim-majority state.
By the standards of Kashmir, where at least 50,000 people have died in a 20-year civil conflict, the current violence is relatively mild. Last week, after days of protests and curfews, police arrested scores of young men. Many more went underground. This was the "pressure" Mehraan had referred to.
So the rocks thrown by Mehraan and his friends have a wider resonance. Enemies of India claim the violent demonstrations in the city reveal the iniquity of the "occupation" of Kashmir and the commitment of locals to independence or accession to Pakistan. Enemies of Pakistan dismiss men like Mehraan as being in the pay of politicians and Pakistan's intelligence services.
"The stone-pelters are being paid and being used by people who want to keep things on the boil and to create the impression that things are not OK [in Kashmir]," said Kuldeep Khoda, who runs the state police force.
Mehraan and his friends tell a different story, however. As he strode through the rundown Nowhatta, collecting fellow stone-pelters as he went, the shopkeeper said he started attacking security forces when his cousin was shot dead two years ago. Then he was arrested and, he claims, tortured. Since then, he says, he has wanted two things: "Azadi" (freedom) and "blood for blood". Alongside him, a 14-year-old says he started a few weeks ago when his friend was killed, allegedly by security forces. "These things happen and nothing is changed and then they happen again," he said.
In fact, many things have changed in Kashmir in recent years. Though clashes between Islamic militants and security forces occur weekly – last week four extremists died in two separate incidents – a fragile peace has come. The resultant economic growth cannot satisfy the demands of a population of whom 62% are under 30 and about half are under 25 and unemployed. Drug abuse, suicides and psychological disorders are rife among the young.
"The reasons for the stone-pelting are mixed," said Ali Mohammed Sagar, one of two parliamentary representatives from Mehraan's neighbourhood of Nowhatta. "Sometimes it is genuine resentment at the government, sometimes it is just to have a bit of action after Friday prayers. Sometimes political groups and parties have egged on people. And unemployment is of course a serious problem."
Another issue may be generational. Political leaders who were once firebrands are less vocal now. A moderate local government was elected last year in a poll that saw a huge turnout. It is composed of "hypocritical collaborators", says Sohail, a 31-year-old government official who leads a band of 50 teenage stone-throwers in weekly demonstrations. Sohail argues that, if stone-pelting does not succeed in forcing more autonomy and a milder security regime for Kashmiris, then the "armed struggle", which in effect ended around five years ago, will start again.
As the shadows of the snow-topped mountains lengthened across Srinagar at 5pm, Mehraan had gathered his troops. A warm-up on a pair of policemen near the main mosque, who fled, then the two or three dozen teenagers, scarfs over their faces, advanced towards the Gojwara checkpoint, gathering bricks and chunks of rocks and hurling them at the policemen, who hurled them back and threatened to fire CS gas. For 20 minutes, the battle continued. Police reinforcements arrived. The teenagers evaded pursuers easily in the narrow side-streets. The stones rained down, clanging off the armoured trucks.
The fight continued as dusk turned to dark. A policeman paused for a moment to answer a question as to when the riot might end. "I don't know," the sergeant said. "It is out of our hands."
Jason Burke• Two commanders seized after deputy leader held
• Militants among 29 killed in explosion at mosque
Pakistan has arrested two more senior Afghan Taliban figures, it emerged yesterday, raising the possibility that Islamabad has begun a major strategic shift away from backing "good" militants.
Mullah Abdul Salam and Mullah Mir Muhammad, the "shadow governors" of the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan respectively, were captured in recent days inside Pakistan.
In a stark illustration of the domestic terrorism problems facing Pakistan, a bomb blast yesterday at a mosque in the north-western tribal belt killed 29 people, including some militants, and injured about 50 others. The explosion tore through the mosque in the Aka Khel area of Khyber, a local official said.
Islamabad has always been viewed as a reluctant partner of the west in Afghanistan, as it was believed to be secretly continuing to support the Taliban and host its leadership on Pakistani soil, despite officially breaking with the militant movement after the 9/11 attacks.
But this week it was revealed that Pakistani authorities had arrested the deputy leader of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Karachi and, when news of the two other Taliban arrests emerged, many analysts argued that a new Islamabad policy could be crystallising.
A more cynical interpretation suggested that, instead of turning its back on the Taliban, Pakistan was simply pressuring them to the negotiating table.
By weakening the Taliban, Islamabad could force the militants into cutting a deal that would still give it some measure of power and a strong say in Afghanistan's future. "I think it's a bit early to call it a strategic shift, but clearly the political calculations in Pakistan are changing," said Shuja Nawaz, an expert on the Pakistani military at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based thinktank. "The idea being they can play a role in getting the US to communicate [with the Taliban]."
The flurry of arrests does raise the question of why Pakistan's military intelligence did not do this earlier. "They seem to have found their old address book," quipped one senior US official in the region. Aside from the Taliban arrests, Pakistani officials also said that up to nine militants linked to al-Qaida were held in overnight raids in Karachi, with the help of intelligence provided by the US. One was identified as Ameer Muawiya, who officials said was in charge of foreign al-Qaida militants operating in Pakistan's tribal area and was an associate of Osama bin Laden.
Pakistan's powerful army and especially its military Inter-Services Intelligence agency, which runs policy towards neighbouring Afghanistan, had appeared to be keeping the Taliban going, in expectation of the day when western forces leave Afghanistan and the extremist movement could return to power, beholden to Islamabad, as it was before 2001.
"I think a shift is taking place inside the military," said Khalid Aziz, head of the Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training, an independent thinktank based in the north-western city of Peshawar.
"At the end of it, if the old model had continued into a post-US withdrawal situation and Pakistan had continued supporting the good Taliban it would almost certainly end up as a civil war in Afghanistan."
Renewed civil war in Afghanistan would blow over to Pakistan, especially its tribal area and North-West Frontier province, which is populated by Pashtuns, the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan.
In a speech this month, Pakistan's army chief, Ashfaq Kayani, claimed he had brushed aside the doctrine of "strategic depth", which meant controlling Afghanistan to stop Indian influence there.
"If Afghanistan is peaceful, stable and friendly, we have our strategic depth because our western border is secure," Kayani said.
Backing the Taliban in the past has also come at a massive domestic cost, as the movement spawned a copycat group in Pakistan that is even more violent and has squarely targeted the state. More civilians were killed in terrorist violence in Pakistan last year than in Afghanistan.
According to the official governor of Kunduz province, Mohammad Omar, the "shadow governors" were arrested in the Pakistani city of Quetta within the last two weeks. The so-called Quetta shura, or leadership council of the Taliban, is supposed to be based in that city. "This [the arrests] is because of the pressure of the world community on Pakistan, and the explosions happening inside Pakistan, the crisis in Pakistan," said Omar.
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said the US was pleased with the recent arrests. He declined to say whether they were the result of better intelligence or an increased willingness by Pakistan.
"What I will say to you, yet again, is that we are enormously heartened by the fact that the Pakistani government and their military intelligence services increasingly recognise the threat within their midst and are doing something about it," Morrell said.
Saeed ShahPakistan officials say Muhammad, brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani, died when missile struck house in North Waziristan
The brother of a senior Afghan Taliban commander, Sirajuddin Haqqani, has been killed in a US missile strike in north Waziristan, Pakistani officials said today .
The two officials said Muhammad Haqqani and three other close associates of the Taliban leader were killed when missiles struck a house in the Dande Darpa Khel area, near the border with Afghanistan.
They said the attack was apparently aimed at Sirajuddin, a senior Taliban commander who is accused of involvement in the ambush of US troops in Afghanistan, including the killing of seven CIA operatives in December.
The US state department has a $5m (£3.25m) bounty on Sirajuddin, also known as Siraj. It claims he is a senior leader of the Haqqani terrorist network founded by his father Jalaluddin, and that he maintains close ties to al-Qaida.
Sirajuddin has admitted planning a 2008 attack against the Serena hotel in Kabul that killed six people, including US citizen Thor David Hesla.
Sirajuddin also admitted to planning the 2008 assassination attempt on the Afghan president Hamid Karzai. He has co-ordinated and participated in cross-border attacks against US and coalition forces in Afghanistan, according to the state department.
The officials said it was not known if Sirajuddin was hurt in the strike.
"Mohammad Haqqani is a younger brother of Sirajuddin. He (Mohammad) was killed in the attack," a security official told Reuters.
A local commander of Pakistani Taliban, confirmed the account, saying that Mohammed Haqqani died in the attack with three of his associates. A relative from Haqqani's family told the Associated Press his funeral was held today,attended by hundreds of residents and relatives.
The US has stepped up drone attacks against North Waziristan militants following the death of the seven CIA operatives, including a woman described as a veteran of the agency's secret intelligence operations, in December. The team was based at Forward Operating Base Chapman, a camp once used by the Afghan army but now a central planning point for the US drone war.
It also emerged earlier this week that the Afghan Taliban's most seniorTaliban commander, Mullah Baradar, was arrested in Karachi.
The Pakistani interior minister, Rahman Malik, said today that officials were still questioning Baradar and two other senior militants arrested in separate operations this month.
If they are not charged in Pakistan they will be sent to Afghanistan and not turned over to US custody, Malik told reporters in Islamabad. "First we will see whether they have violated any law ... If they have done it, then the law will take its own course against them.
"If they have not done anything, then they will go back to the country of origin, not to USA," Malik said.
Pakistani authorities arrested Baradar about two weeks ago and security forces picked up Taliban "shadow governors" for two Afghan provinces at about the same time.
A series of raids by Pakistani forces have followed, netting at least nine al-Qaida-linked militants.
The Haqqani network has a history of links to Pakistani intelligence that some suspect continue today. The US considers the network one of the biggest threats to its operations in Afghanistan, and has urged Pakistan to move against the Haqqanisit. Pakistan has held off on any major operation, but may be aiding the US missile campaign.
The network's leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani,, was a respected commander and key US and Pakistani ally in resisting the Soviet Union after its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. In the 1980s and 1990s, Haqqani also hosted Saudi fighters including Osama bin Laden. That hospitality is believed to still extend to al-Qaida and other foreign fighters on both sides of the border.
Jalaluddin Haqqani, believed to be in his 60s or older, is said to be too ill to do much now, and his son Sirajuddin is running the network. The group is alleged to make its money through kidnappings, extortion and other crime in at least three eastern Afghan provinces.
The US president, Barack Obama, has stepped up the use of missile strikes from unmanned drones in Pakistan's lawless tribal area since taking office, partly in response to the Pakistani government's reluctance to target Taliban militants who are not deemed a direct threat to the state.
James SturckeMullah Baradar's capture fits into Pakistan's complex strategy – but it must be careful not to push its luck
There has been plenty of tub-thumping over this week's capture of Taliban commander Mullah Baradar, but all it really signifies is that Pakistan holds all the cards in the strategic game being played out across central and southern Asia.
President Barack Obama is well-known for his love of poker. It is a comforting image for the rest of the world: the stony-faced thinker, calculating the odds, in the game for the long haul. But when it comes to the bluff, no one can touch Pakistan's military establishment. Consider the complexity of the game it is playing.
America's enemies are based in their country, but they can still wring $7.5bn in aid from Washington. Their population hates the idea of colluding with the Americans, but Pakistan quietly allows US drones, platoons of marines and CIA agents to operate in its territory. It fights its own insurgency with some parts of the Pakistani Taliban while doing deals with its affiliates. Known terrorists are free to hold public rallies in broad daylight calling for attacks on India, and yet India still finds itself pressured into holding a new round of peace talks.
While India spends billions of dollars in development aid and construction projects in Afghanistan, Pakistan bides its time and then demands that India pack its bags and head home as the price of its cooperation with the US. And who can blame it? After all the bloodshed Pakistan has suffered in the past nine years, should it really have to stomach its sworn enemy setting up camp on the western flank?
Meanwhile, the west has one priority – getting out of Afghanistan before it drags all their governments into the gutter. In its obsessive focus on every detail of Operation Moshtarak and the Afghan surge, Mullah Baradar's arrest looks like a big tactical victory. But for Pakistan it will barely muster a footnote in the much broader narrative.
There are a tonne of theories as to what motivated Pakistan's shadowy Inter-Services Intelligence agency to suddenly co-operate in handing over an old ally. Were they making sure he did not make a deal behind their back? Were they buying some influence with the Americans? Or was it a stern warning to the Afghan Taliban to stay in line?
In the end, the truth is unimportant. Baradar was dispensable and he was dispensed with. The Pakistani establishment can sell his arrest to the Americans as a sign they are co-operating, sell it to Mullah Omar and Kabul as a reminder of who's boss, and it can brush the whole thing under the carpet to its own citizens. Is it a change of strategy, or just a bluff? We are unlikely to ever know for sure.
Compare that with the game being played by the Americans. They, too, know that everything comes down to perceptions. That has been the mantra ever since Stan McChrystal took over as US commander in Afghanistan last summer. But look at the task he faces: selling to voters back home that an end is in sight (while President Hamid Karzai says he needs another 10-15 years to finish the job), selling to civilians in the war zone that they can be protected (despite the inevitable civilian casualties), selling to the Taliban that their butts will be kicked (if only we knew where they were).
Is anyone buying? No. It is not the fault of the troops on the ground, who are now thoroughly versed in the intricacies of counter-insurgency. But playing the game of perceptions is difficult in a country shot through with "ethnic paranoia, national self-doubt and conspiracy theories".
And if you are trying to play a tense game of high-stakes poker, it is probably best if you don't show everyone your cards before you start. By telling the world that the troops would start shipping out in mid-2011, that is exactly what Obama did.
It is not his fault, of course. He had to offer a sop to the anti-war contingent. Plus, the US has none of the advantages available to the Pakistanis. They have known all the players in this game for decades. They know how they think, what they are planning, who can be trusted and who needs to be kicked off the table.
At the same time, they are also engaged in a game with India, one which is ultimately far more important to them. If you want a clear statement of the futility of America's current surge in Afghanistan, take this line from a recent editorial: "The war on the western front will not be solved if Pakistan's army continues to regard India's army on the eastern front as the major threat." If that is true, then the west might as well pack up and go home today.
Sure, there are talks planned between India and Pakistan next week. But you would be hard-pressed to find a single person on this side of the world who thinks any progress whatsoever is going to be made. It has been 63 years since they started arguing and fighting over Kashmir, and so far neither side has shown any interest in budging from its original stance.
Whatever glimmers of hope might have existed when the talks were announced earlier this month evaporated when the explosion ripped through the German Bakery in Pune at the weekend. Now all the Indians want to talk about is terrorism, and Pakistan can stick to the line that it does not the support the jihadists in its midst.
There is huge risk in the games Pakistan plays. It has lost of hundreds of lives to its own Taliban insurgency and its intelligence agencies could easily lose control of a jihadist front in Kashmir that has its own agenda and its own momentum. India has the fortitude to withstand only so much, and another series of terrorist strikes like it experienced in 2007 and 2008 may well prove more than it can stand.
While Pakistan remains in some semblance of control, there is hope that some form of compromised stability might be achieved across the region. But if its handle on the situation slips even slightly, the whole pack of cards could very quickly collapse.
Eric RandolphThe former president has hinted at a return to Pakistani politics. Worryingly, it could be more than just a pipe dream
At no point do world leaders look more diminished than after leaving office, and Pakistan's former president and military dictator Pervez Musharraf is no exception. So when he addressed a London audience this week, it was perhaps ironic that much of what he said was a reminder that little has changed in the way the west relates to the "AfPak" region.
It was all very George Bush. The world must "stay the course" in Afghanistan and Pakistan because it is the centre of the greatest threat to international security in the post-cold war world, namely Islamist terrorism. US-led forces in Afghanistan must "saturate" insurgency-hit regions "with strength". He added that the region must not be abandoned as had occurred after the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan 21 years ago because it would remain a breeding ground for terrorism. The clear message was that Pakistan is a garrison state whose forces must be subsidised well into the future.
Almost no one would disagree with this thesis, or at least the idea that regions devastated by wars and foreign interference ought not to be left to their own devices once the dust settles. But the deafening silence over Musharraf's personal responsibility for the devastation remains. What is especially troubling is the way that his still-fresh tenure – after all, he resigned as president of Pakistan less than two years ago – has already been swept into the history books.
That history refuses to lay dormant.
Gordon Brown's government has been rocked by the Binyam Mohamed torture scandal. We now know that Mohamed was tortured in Pakistan. In fact, Musharraf's Pakistan was a key conduit through which thousands were kidnapped and tortured, often under intense pressure from Britain and the US. Did the general collude in this? Did he facilitate the disappearance of thousands of his own citizens too? These important questions remain unanswered, thanks in part to Whitehall's equivocal stance over Mohamed's torture.
Much like Tony Blair at the Chilcot inquiry, Musharraf defended his record as commander-in-chief. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of his rule was his perceived double game of appeasing the Taliban by, among other things, signing ceasefires with them in the tribal areas while talking tough on the White House lawn. Now, he countered, the reconciliation approach is exactly what is being attempted in Afghanistan. In contrast, he rationalised inaction against non-Taliban militancy in the Punjab on the basis that it was a delicate matter that would take time to solve.
Neither response was particularly convincing, but the fact that he fought for his reputation nevertheless spoke volumes.
Musharraf has frequently if indirectly hinted at making a comeback to Pakistani politics, but only if the "people of Pakistan" want him – a familiar euphemism for drumming up support through back channels. Musharraf remains popular in many quarters of Pakistan society, as demonstrated by an online fan page replete with hagiographic comments and over 130,000 members. Musharraf proponents point to his international standing. No living Pakistani is as internationally recognisable as the former army chief, just as no serving head of state has brought with them as much pre-existing controversy as the incumbent, president Asif Ali Zardari.
With Pakistan facing fresh crises almost every week – the latest being an ongoing dispute between an empowered judiciary and the government of president Zardari – now is as good a time as ever for Musharraf to stake his credentials with Pakistani and international audiences.
Like former prime minister Benazir Bhutto before him, Musharraf is an eloquent and confident speaker. That might explain why he remains a frequent guest in the lecture circuit. But, also like Bhutto, there is a profound gap between rhetoric and reality. All of our politicians decry the appalling poverty in Pakistan, yet none have taken significant steps to end the corruption and inequality that fuels it. Musharraf's Pakistan was showered with billions of pounds that were almost totally unaccounted for. Many wonder why so little – even less than a trickle – was spent on the schools, infrastructure and hospitals he now claims are vital to vicariously defeating extremism in Pakistan.
There is renewed hope that will change with the Obama administration's package of non-military funding – $7.5bn over five years – which has significant strings attached to it. In Pakistan too there are subtle signs that things may be changing.
Musharraf's successor as army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, has gone to great lengths to avoid the media. Although impossible to predict, army insiders say he has no interest in formal politics and is looking forward to retirement later this year. The contrast with Musharraf could not be clearer. Perhaps the army has learned from his mistakes.
Mustafa QadriNews comes as US special envoy Richard Holbrooke visits Islamabad and bomb blast kills 29 in tribal north-west
Two senior Taliban officials were arrested in Pakistan this month in what appears to be a crackdown against Afghan militants operating on Pakistani territory.
Mullah Abdul Salam and Mullah Mir Mohammad, respectively the "shadow governors" of the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan, were arrested in Baluchistan province, Mohammad Omar, the Afghan governor for Kunduz, told Reuters.
The two were picked up about 10 to 12 days ago, according to Afghan and Pakistani officials.
Both were key figures in the Taliban's efforts to spread their influence to northern Afghanistan from their heartland in the south. Taliban troops in the north also threaten Nato supply lines coming south from Central Asia.
Earlier this week officials confirmed that a joint CIA-Pakistani security operation had captured the number two Afghan Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in the southern Pakistani city of Karachi. Nato considers his arrest as a significant blow against the Taliban as he was, in effect, the chairman of the so-called Quetta Shura – the leadership council of the Taliban, named after the south-western Pakistani city near or in which it is thought to be based.
The US and Pakistan have said very little publicly about the arrests. Afghanistan and the US have long complained about Pakistan's unwillingness or inability to arrest senior Afghan Taliban figures operating with seeming impunity in Pakistan's border area with Afghanistan. The arrests could mean that Pakistan has decided to turn on the Afghan Taliban, a group it considers a strategic ally against its traditional rival India, though some suspect the Pakistanis were forced to act because the US had intelligence on Baradar.
Pakistani officials also said that up to nine militants linked to al-Qaida were arrested in overnight raids in Karachi with the help of intelligence provided by the US. One was identified as Ameer Muawiya, who officials said was in charge of foreign al-Qaida militants operating in Pakistan's tribal regions near Afghanistan and was an associate of Osama bin Laden.
News of the latest arrests came as the White House's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, held talks with government leaders in Islamabad on security issues.
"We commend the Pakistanis for their role in this, and it is part of a deepening co-operation between us," he said.
The previous day in Kabul, Holbrooke called the arrest of Baradar "a significant development".
Pakistan's prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, told Holbrooke that the US should take into account Pakistan's concerns that the offensive in Marjah in Helmand province could lead to Afghan refugees and militants heading to Pakistan's south-west and north-west, according to Gilani's office. The pair also discussed US humanitarian aid efforts, with Gilani pressing for a quicker release of funds. The US has pledged $7.5bn (£4.7bn) in aid to Pakistan over the next five years.
In a stark illustration of the security concerns Holbrooke discussed with Pakistani officials, a bomb blast at a mosque in Pakistan's north-western tribal belt killed 29 people, including some militants. The explosion tore through a mosque in the Aka Khel area of Khyber, wounding some 50 others, a local official said. No group claimed responsibility, but Khan said the dead included militants from Lashkar-e-Islam, an insurgent group in Khyber that has clashed with another militant organisation known as Ansarul Islam. Both espouse Taliban-style ideologies.
Meanwhile it has emerged that representatives of the Taliban and Afghan MPs met for talks in the Maldives last month. Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban official who is now a member of Afghanistan's parliament, was one of those who attended. He said mediators had told the militants' representatives they should present a united front and conduct talks in consultation with the government and not through other channels. He did not elaborate but analysts say Kabul is suspicious of any Pakistani involvement.
If some form of convergence of views is taking place between the Pakistan army and the US, then this is progress
The arrest of Mullah Baradar, the commander in chief of the Taliban, is unlikely to have an immediate impact on the insurgency in Afghanistan. Baradar is Mullah Omar's chief of staff, the man who ran operations and appointed commanders in what remains an organisation with a high degree of central control. He is a member of the old Taliban, the figure put up for interviews and the author of a new set of rules of engagement which urged fighters to avoid civilian casualties. We also know he had difficulty imposing a new command structure, meeting resistance from a younger, harder generation of fighters who show no qualms about the use of suicide bombers in purely civilian targets like marketplaces. For this reason, it could be that violence increases after this arrest. Time and again when senior commanders have been arrested or killed, the Taliban structure under Mullah Omar has demonstrated its ability to regenerate itself, and one should never forget that there are three other groups who operate semi-independently – the Haqqani network, Hizb-i-Islami, run by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in eastern Afghanistan, and Tehrik-i-Taliban in North Waziristan.
But none of the above means that Baradar's arrest is insignificant. Karachi, where he was captured, and the Pakistan army's Inter-Services Intelligence, who captured him in a joint operation with the CIA, are just as relevant as the arrest itself. A succession of visiting US emissaries have accused the ISI of sheltering the very people in the Taliban high command that it has now shown it can arrest. So does the capture of the mullah mark a shift of thinking within the Pakistan military?
Two events on other fronts may have presaged the mullah's arrest. The first is that India and Pakistan are once again talking about talking to each other, after a long interval caused by the carnage in Mumbai in November 2008. The breakthrough came earlier this month, when India's home minister P Chidambaram said the handler of the group that launched the assault could have been an Indian, or "someone who acquired Indian characteristics". The careful formulation of words was new. In using this phrasing he was apparently dropping India's precondition that it would not resume the talks until Pakistan admitted sheltering militant groups operating on its soil and cracked down on them. There is no agreement as to what will be discussed at the level of foreign secretary, but the fact that talks are spluttering to life again is significant for regional stability. The war on the western front will not be solved if Pakistan's army continues to regard India's army on the eastern front as the major threat.
The second detectable shift in the tectonic plates was contained in a series of interviews given recently by the head of Pakistan army, General Pervez Kayani, in which he reinterpreted the traditional formula used by the military to defend keeping contacts open with the Taliban. Gen Kayani acknowledged that Pakistan sought "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, but added "we do want to control it … a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan can provide Pakistan with a strategic depth". The week before, the general suggested that Pakistan was prepared to train the Afghan national army.
Both the general's words and the prospects of another round of talks with India could be swiftly undone by another militant attack in India. The Pakistan army, the US and India are still far apart in their analysis of, never mind their solution to, the war in Afghanistan. The US, for one, is not clear whether it wants to split the Taliban or engage with them. If some form of convergence of views is taking place between the Pakistan army and the US – admittedly a big if – then this is progress. The ISI, empowered by its capacity to penetrate the upper reaches of the Taliban, might persuade more of them that a political solution exists. Without that, the Taliban could fight on for years.
ISI and CIA arrest Baradar in joint Karachi operation in a move that may signal tougher approach to militants
Pakistan's powerful military is ready to move aggressively against the Taliban, it was claimed tonight after news broke that the organisation's top military commander, Mullah Baradar, had been arrested in a dramatic operation in Karachi.
The shift in Pakistani policy could help nudge western countries towards a peace deal in Afghanistan, analysts and diplomats said, even if the idea of talks with the Taliban is in its infancy, with British and American policy still focused on fighting and splitting the movement.
The Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) and the CIA arrested Baradar, 42, in a joint operation on the edge of the teeming port city on 8 February, security sources in Karachi said. His capture is a major coup for the US, which is currently leading a sweeping anti-Taliban operation across the border in Helmand.
Baradar is a leading light of the Quetta shura, the Taliban governing council that directs the insurgency from the western Pakistani city of the same name. He is considered second only to the insurgents' one-eyed fugitive leader, Mullah Omar.
Since 8 February Baradar has been intensively interrogated by Pakistani officials under US supervision and has started to provide information about the insurgency, US officials claimed after news of his arrest was broken by the New York Times. It is a great blow to the Taliban, but unlikely to be fatal: the insurgency has demonstrated remarkable resilience since 2001. But the arrest's true significance, analysts said, was that it was led by the ISI, possibly signalling a big change in Pakistani policy towards the Afghan militants.
Although Pakistan severed its ties with the Taliban in 2001, US and British officials suspect the military has quietly retained some ties in the hope of using the militants as a tool of influence once western troops leave Afghanistan. A western diplomat in Afghanistan described it as a "very complex relationship". The army has vehemently denied any linkages; last year an ISI official told the Guardian of 60 joint ISI-CIA operations against Taliban targets. But until this month the ISI has never captured and handed over a major Afghan commander.
"The big thing here is that ISI actually helped to get him. It shows that the Pakistani attitude to the Taliban is shifting," said Kamran Bokhari, a US-based analyst with the Stratfor thinktank. "The Pakistanis are co-operating. Obviously they are not co-operating for free. They are getting something from the Americans."
Bokhari said that in return for ISI co-operation the US may be pressing India to re-establish a dialogue with Pakistan that collapsed after the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008. Senior diplomats from both countries are due to meet in New Delhi next week., in a sign of thawing relations
Today the US senator John Kerry visited Islamabad, where he offered to play a part in the resumption of dialogue. Indian officials insist the process was not a consequence of US pressure and have long resisted any foreign mediation in the Kashmir dispute, which they insist is a strictly bilateral matter.
But international impatience for a resolution of the Afghan war may be changing the regional calculus. In the aftermath of the London conference on Afghanistan on 28 January, British and American officials have ramped up an internal debate about the merits of peace talks with the Taliban, and whether it is preferable to engage the insurgents directly or send messages through Saudi or Pakistani mediators.
Then two weeks ago the Pakistani army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, gave a series of briefings to reporters in which he described a peaceful Afghanistan as part of Pakistan's "strategic depth" – words that encouraged diplomats and analysts to believe that Pakistan's approach to the Taliban was changing.
Since then, according to a western diplomat in Islamabad, Pakistan's army has clearly signalled its willingness to facilitate talks between the US and the Taliban, probably through the ISI. But he said the exact nature of the suggested role remained unclear, in particular whether Pakistan was suggesting it would deal directly with the militants or just facilitate contacts with western negotiators.
The key to the evolving Pakistani approach might be assurances the military has received about India, whose strong presence in Afghanistan has long been a source of concern in Islamabad.
"It's very clear to me that the Pakistanis understand that this fight is for them and it's a fight for everybody who is going to stand up against terrorism," Kerry told CNN after meeting Pakistan's army chief, president and prime minister.
The Taliban denied Baradar had been captured. "They want to spread this rumour just to divert the attention of people from their defeats in Marjah and confuse the public," spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told Reuters.
Marjah is the focus of the Nato offensive dubbed Operation Moshtarak, the largest of the nine-year war, with some 15,000 mostly British, American and Afghan troops involved. As it entered its fourth day yesterday coalition troops continued to meet sporadic resistance but said Taliban attacks appeared to be waning. Baradar's capture is unlikely to sunder the insurgency, which has proven resilient to similar setbacks over the past nine years. British special forces reportedly killed the ruthless commander Mullah Dadullah Mansoor in 2007 but the insurgency subsequently worsened.
Human rights groups raised concerns about Baradar's possible mistreatment. The ISI has a "long and well-documented history of mistreating and torturing detainees", said Ali Dayan Hasan, senior South Asia researcher for Human Rights Watch.
Declan WalshJulian BorgerPakistan-US team believed to have seized movement's deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar near madrasa
Karachi, a churning mega-city of 18 million souls, is an easy place to get lost in – which was probably its attraction to Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.
But the Taliban deputy leader's luck ran out on 8 February when a joint Pakistani-American team swooped on him near a madrasa on the lawless city limits.
According to two security sources in Karachi, the ISI-CIA team arrested Baradar at Loni Kot, an industrial area notorious for banditry on the edge of the city, near the Khuddam-ul-Qur'an madrasa.
Sources said they did not know if the madrasa had any links to the Jamiat I Khuddam-ul-Qur'an, an organisation that briefly surfaced in 2002 as a vehicle for "moderate" Taliban leaders, then disappeared.
The account could not be independently verified, and most intelligence officials remained tight-lipped today about the arrest of Baradar, the most senior Taliban capture since 2001.
What was certain, though, was that Baradar's arrest confirmed the growing importance of Karachi, a chaotic city with a bloodstained history of violence, to the Taliban leadership. "His capture in Karachi shows the Quetta shura [the Taliban war council] is not even in Quetta," said analyst Kamran Bokhari.
One western diplomat said Taliban leaders had been arriving in Karachi for several months, driven by US threats that it would extend its drone strikes into Balochistan. In other ways, though, the Karachi link is nothing new: the Taliban have been quietly using the city as a logistics, finance and travel hub for years.
With an estimated 2.5 million ethnic Pashtuns, and hundreds of largely unregulated madrasas, the city provides a deep human sea into which militants can easily disappear.
Last October the Daily Times newspaper reported that 60 Taliban leaders had fled from the Swat valley, 800 miles to the north-west, to Karachi, from where they boarded flights to the Middle East.
Karachi is also a source of hard cash. Last year city police noticed a spike in Taliban-orchestrated bank robberies and kidnappings in the city.
One hostage – a local film distributor – was whisked away to the tribal belt along the Afghan border until a handsome ransom was paid.
In Karachi the Taliban find many fellow extremists.
The city is periodically rocked by ethnic, sectarian and militant violence.
A US diplomat was killed by a suicide bomber here in 2006; two attacks on Shia religious processions over the past six weeks have killed dozens.
The Taliban presence is also inflaming ethnic tensions.
For months the ruling Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) party has warned of the "Talibanisation" of Karachi at the hands of their Pashtun rivals.
But the threat may be exaggerated: the Taliban have rarely carried out militant operations in the city, preferring to quietly maintain it as a base for men, money and movements.
Declan WalshThis is huge, is it not? It's not every day you capture the Taliban's number two man. In fact, it's not ever, until last week, when it apparently happened.
It's amazing because the view here in the states has been that we've made precious little progress penetrating the Quetta Shura, the name for the Taliban's military leadership.
It's doubly amazing because it was done in coordination with the ISI. The ISI? Wow. If Pakistan's intelligence agency is really now cooperating with US forces against the Taliban and al-Qaida, then that is a very huge deal indeed.
And it's triply amazing, of course, because as every right-thinking person knows, Barack Obama is soft on terrorism and wants America to fail. I wonder what Dick Cheney will have to say today. Something tells me he'll duck interviews for a few days. Except for Fox of course, which will tee up his toxic propaganda in whatever form he wishes.
Now that we have Baradar in custody, as the attackerman points out, it's vitally important that we get good intel out of the guy:
The ultimate point of fighting the Taliban is to compel them to give up fighting and accept some version of a post-Taliban order in Afghanistan. Torturing Baradar — which the Pakistanis have been known to do — is counterproductive to that effort. If we treat the guy respectfully, in a demonstrated way, it might spur a reconsideration of Taliban goals. I am not counting any chickens, but any hope of a game-changing possibility will be foreclosed upon if we or our allies torture Baradar. Let's be smart — and true to Obama's stated principles/executive order. If there was any doubt whatsoever, the Abdulmutallab case proved we don't need to torture to get good intelligence.
I don't honestly know what would spur a reconsideration of Taliban goals. But I do feel fairly confident that waterboarding their second-in-command would not.
This is a red-letter day. In conjunction with the positive early reports out of Marja, if they are to be believed, maybe we're turning some corners over there.
Detention of Abdul Ghani Baradar most significant breakthrough in US-led hunt for Taliban leaders in many years
Mullah Barader, the Taliban's powerful second in command, has been captured in the Pakistani city of Karachi, senior US officials have confirmed.
The detention of Abdul Ghani Barader is the most significant breakthrough in many years of the US-led hunt for the Taliban's leaders, and comes as Nato forces continue to advance into Taliban-held areas in the southern Afghan province of Helmand.
Barader was seized in a secret joint operation by Pakistani and US intelligence forces, according to US government officials quoted in the New York Times. Mullah Barader has been in Pakistani custody for several days, with US and Pakistani intelligence officials both taking part in interrogations, according to the officials. Though Barack Obama has banned US agencies from using forms of torture such as waterboarding, Pakistani questioning techniques are frequently brutal.
US officials later confirmed the report of Baradar's capture to the Associated Press news agency.
Barader is believed to have been born in the central Afghan province of Oruzgan. He is the most trusted lieutenant of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the supreme leader of the Taliban, and has been ultimately responsible for the execution of the insurgents' military and political strategy since being appointed to the position in 2002. He is, in effect, chairman of the so-called Quetta Shura – the leadership council of the Taliban, named after the south-western Pakistani city near or in which it is thought to be based – and is known to be close to Osama bin Laden.
That his capture appears to have occurred in Karachi underlines the degree to which senior Afghan militants have used Pakistan as a secure base for their operations, but may also signal a very significant change in attitude on the part of the Pakistani army towards the hardline Afghan Islamist militant movement.
The Pakistani security establishment's ambivalent attitude towards the Taliban has been repeatedly cited as a major cause of the problems that have beset the western intervention in Afghanistan since then fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001.
Barader, reported to be aged between 41 and 48, may have been forced to flee more secure hiding places alongside the Afghan-Pakistani frontier by the repeated and increasingly effective strikes by unmanned drones. Karachi, a metropolis of 14 million people, was where key 9/11 conspirator Ramzi bin al'Shibh was seized in September 2002.
The New York Times said it had learned of Baradar's capture on Thursday but delayed reporting it at the request of White House officials, who told the newspaper making it public would end a hugely successful intelligence-gathering effort. According to the New York Times, officials said the group's leaders had been unaware of Baradar's capture, and if it became public they might become more careful about communicating with each other.
Jason Burke